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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
MATURITY DATE OF A NOTE PAYABLE ON
DEMAND AFTER DATE
Continental Oil Co. v. Horsey'
Defendant-appellee executed a written agreement guar-
anteeing payment to plaintiff-appellant of any sum of
money due on account of the shortage of A. A shortage
having been ascertained, plaintiff-appellant obtained from
A a note for the amount thereof, payable "on demand after
date", and authorizing confession of judgment.2 In a suit
by plaintiff-appellant to hold defendant-appellee on the
written guarantee, a verdict was directed for the defend-
ants on the theory that, the note being payable on demand
after date, there was a suspension of enforcement of the
obligation for one day, which materially altered the obli-
gation guaranteed and, therefore, released the guarantors.
On appeal from the judgment entered on said directed ver-
dict, held: Reversed and new trial awarded. A note
payable on demand after date is a demand note, and the
obligation of a guarantor is not released by the taking of
a demand note, since there is no suspension of enforcement
of the obligation.
The case is of little interest for its stated holding, i. e.,
that a note payable "on demand after date" is a demand
note, for this is in accord with the weight of authority.3 It
is of major importance, however, as an indication that the
recent opinion of the Court on the original argument in
Iglehart v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of Annapolis4 is not to be
considered Maryland law. In that case, the opinion in
question stated that notes payable on demand after date,
which contained a provision for confession of judgment
at any time before maturity, were non-negotiable. As
1177 Md. 383, 9 A. (2d) 607 (1930).
2 The note read:
"$665.42 Denton, Maryland, March 26, 1937
On Demand after date, for value received, I promise to pay to the
order of Continental Oil Company Six Hundred Sixty-five and 42/100
DOLLARS at THE DENTON NATIONAL BANK, And all costs and
ten per centum commissions for collecting the same, and I, we or
either of us, whether makers, securities or endorsers, hereby confess
judgment, to be entered by the proper official, at any time after matur-
ity for the amount then due hereunder, with all exemptions waived.'
(1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 176, 181. It is interesting to note that part of
the Court's reasoning at 177 Md. 385, "but that form, (of note) usually,
and perhaps always, the result of writing the note on a printed blank",
adopts, in effect the argument set forth, (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 176, 180,
n. 17.
4 197 A. 133, 200 A. 833, 117 A. L. R. 667 (Md. 1938). Noted (1939) 3 Md.
L. Rev. 176; (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 921; and (1938) 117 A. L. R. 667, 673.
The decision is not mentioned in the briefs of counsel for either party.
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pointed out in the REVIEW'S comment on that opinion,5
while the opinion did not discuss the time of the maturity
of the notes there involved, the only possible inference
was that the Court regarded them as maturing at some
time after delivery, since otherwise there would have been
no time before maturity when a judgment could have been
confessed. The fact that the Court in the instant case,
in adopting the majority view on the point common to both
cases, failed to make any reference to the opinion rendered
in the Iglehart case, must be taken as an indication that
the Court does not consider that opinion to be the law of
Maryland. For, it should be noted that after that opinion
was rendered, a motion for reargument was granted, and
on reargument the lower Court was affirmed by a divided
court, "without opinion". The effect of this action on the
motion for re-argument having been to nullify the earlier
opinion, it never became law. That this is so is evidenced
by the fact that the earlier opinion has never been officially
reported, even in the form of a memorandum opinion.'
Assuming, however, that the earlier opinion had be-
come law, it must be regarded as overruled by the decision
in the instant case. This is so, even though the note in
the instant case provided for confession of judgment after
maturity and is to this extent distinguishable from the
notes in the Iglehart case. The rules relating to the effect
on negotiability of a confessed judgment provision were
long ago laid down by the Court of Appeals 7 and their
application to the notes in either of the cases under dis-
cussion depends only on the determination of the maturity
date of the notes. As stated in the former comment, "for
the purpose of determining when limitations begin to run,
i. e., when suit may be maintained on the instrument, a
note payable on demand is due immediately, without any
other demand but the suit, unless a different intention is
apparent from the terms of the instrument or the purposes
and circumstances of the transaction."8  It was suggested
(1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 176, 180.
Nor was the Per Curiam after reargument reported, since affirmances
by even division of the Court of Appeals are never officially reported.
Both the original opinion and the Per Curiam appeared in the Atlantic
Reporter. See supra n. 4.
I Edelen v. First Nat. Bank, 139 Md. 422, 115 A. 602 (1921) ; Crothers
v. National Bank, 158 Md. 587, 149 A. 270 (1930).
s (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 176, 182. This rule Is recognized in part in the
instant case, 177 Md. 383, 385, 386, where the Court states: "A note pay-
able on demand is payable immediately, without demand. Limitations
begin to run on the day of execution of such an instrument." It has been
recognized in full in BUck v. Cockins, 131 Md. 625, 630, 102 A. 1022, 1025
(1917).
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in the former comment that the provision for confession
of judgment "at any time before maturity" might present
a basis for argument that a different intention (as to ma-
turity date) was apparent from the face of the instru-
ment.9 However, it is believed that an attempt at recon-
ciliation of the two decisions on the ground that the Court,
in the original opinion in the Iglehart case, was, for this
reason, holding the note not to be a demand note, is not
tenable, particularly since the opinion in the Iglehart case
makes no mention of this factor as a ground for its decision.
Further, in the instant case, a similar argument, i. e., that a
different intention was apparent from the provision "upon
demand after date" was made by appellee's counsel"' and
rejected by the Court.
It is fortunate that the feared perpetuation of the
rule stated in the Iglehart opinion has not occurred.
9 Ibid. It was, however submitted that the argument was not well
founded, especially in view of the fact that the particular wording was in
the printed part of a form note.
10 Appellee's Brief, 9, 10.
